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Abstract
Resource allocation problems are a fundamental domain in which to evaluate the fairness properties
of algorithms, and the trade-offs between fairness and utilization have a long history in this domain. A
recent line of work has considered fairness questions for resource allocation when the demands for the
resource are distributed across multiple groups and drawn from a probability distribution. In such cases,
a natural fairness requirement is that individuals from different groups should have (approximately)
equal probabilities of receiving the resource. A largely open question in this area has been to bound
the gap between the maximum possible utilization of the resource and the maximum subject to this
fairness condition.
Here we obtain some of the first provable upper bounds on this gap. We show lower bounds but
also some general upper bounds for arbitrary distributions, as well as much stronger upper bounds for
specific families of distributions that are typically used to model levels of demand. In particular, we
find — somewhat surprisingly — that there are natural classes of distributions for which it is possible
to simultaneously achieve maximum utilization and the given notion of fairness; and we show that for
power-law distributions, there is a non-trivial gap between the solutions, but this gap can be bounded
by a constant independent of the parameters of the distribution.
1 Introduction
The current interest in fairness properties of algorithms includes several distinct themes, one of which is
the question of fairness in allocating scarce resources. Research on this question has a long history, with
foundational work in the 1980s and 1990s on allocating resources in computer systems [1, 2, 3]. Allocation
problems continue to form an important topic for fairness considerations, especially as automated systems
make allocation decisions in a wide range of areas that reach far beyond the original computational settings
of the problem [4, 5].
Recently, Elzayn et al. (2019) considered a novel allocation problem in this style. In their formulation,
individuals are divided into groups, each of which has some probability distribution of candidates who
desire the resource. There is a fixed amount of resource R and the question is how to allocate this resource
across the groups. Such a set-up arises in many applications; as one concrete motivating example for
purposes of discussion, suppose that we have a set number of doctors, each with a maximum number of
people they can assist, and we would like to allocate them across a set of N geographically distributed
regions. Each region contains a population with a potentially different probability distribution over the
number of sick people in need of doctors. We know the distribution of demand for each region, but we will
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only know the actual demand — drawn from these distributions — once we have allocated the doctors by
dividing them up in some fashion across the regions. If a community has too few doctors, some sick people
will go unassisted; and if a community has more doctors than it needs for the number of sick people it
has, some of the doctor’s capacity to help will go unused. Formally, the expected number of candidates
that receive a resource under a certain allocation is called the utilization of that allocation.
One allocation strategy could be to put the doctors where they are most likely to be used, with the aim
of maximizing utilization. However, such an allocation could potentially “starve” certain regions, leaving
them with very few doctors even though they have a non-trivial level of need. Such an allocation violates
a natural definition of fairness: sick people in some regions would have a higher probability of receiving
assistance than sick people in other regions, which conflicts with the premise that people are equally
deserving of care from the doctors.
In this work, we thus say that an allocation is fair across multiple regions if a candidate who needs the
resource has the same probability of receiving it, regardless of the region they belong to: the identity
of the region doesn’t impact the probability that those in need obtain assistance. At some points, we
relax this definition slightly to say that an allocation is α-fair if the probability that a candidate receives
the resource in two different regions is within a maximum difference of α, for α ∈ [0, 1] across all of the
regions. Note that α = 0 corresponds to our initial notion of fairness, and α = 1 imposes no constraint
at all on the allocation.
Elzayn et al. (2019) consider a version of this allocation problem in the scenario where the candidate
probability distributions are unknown and must be learned. At each time step, a certain allocation is
chosen and the feedback obtained reveals only the number of candidates who received the resource, not the
true number. They adapt learning results from previous dark pool trading scenarios proposed in Ganchev
et al. (2009). From these results, they construct algorithms that learn utilization-maximizing and α-fair
utilization maximizing allocations through this type of censored feedback1. They also define the Price of
Fairness (PoF) as the ratio of the utilizations of the max-utilizing allocation and the max-utilizing α-fair
allocation. From an empirical dataset, they calculate the PoF for various levels of α in practice. However,
they largely left open the following category of questions: can we obtain theoretical upper bounds on the
PoF over different probability distributions? These questions appear to become quite complex even when
the distributions are known.
The present work: The interaction of fairness and utilization. In this work we obtain bounds on
the price of fairness for this family of resource allocation problems, both through general results that hold
for all distributions and through stronger results that are specific to common families of distributions.
We also distinguish between two versions of the problem — one in which we require that the allocation
to each group be integer-valued, and one in which we allow resources to be allocated fractionally (or
probabilistically, which yields equivalent results in expectation).
In the case of integer-valued resource allocation, we show through a constructive proof that the PoF can
be unboundedly large. If we allow resources to be allocated fractionally, then we show that the PoF is
bounded above by 1α for arbitrary distributions and α > 0. In the case where α = 0, the PoF can be
unboundedly large for fractional allocations as well.
We then show that much stronger upper bounds can be obtained for large families of distributions that
are often used to model levels of demand. First we show that certain families of natural distributions
have PoF equal to 1, the smallest possible bound: for these distributions, there is no trade-off between
fairness and maximum utilization. We show that distributions with this property include Exponential
and Weibull distributions. We then consider the family of Power Law distributions; we show that these
1They consider a related, but different definition of fairness from the one used in this work. Later sections will expand
on this difference.
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EC∼CA [min(C, vA)] EC∼CB [min(C, vB)] U(vA, vB)
{vA = 0, vB = 2} 0.6 min(0, 0) + 0.4 min(2, 0) = 0 0.3 min(0, 2) + 0.7 min(3, 2) = 1.4 1.4
{vA = 1, vB = 1} 0.6 min(0, 1) + 0.4 min(2, 1) = 0.4 0.3 min(0, 1) + 0.7 min(3, 1) = 0.7 1.1
{vA = 2, vB = 0} 0.6 min(0, 2) + 0.4 min(2, 2) = 0.8 0.3 min(0, 0) + 0.7 min(3, 0) = 0 0.8
Table 1: Utilization of resources across two groups in motivating example
distributions have a PoF that can be strictly greater than 1, but is always bounded above by a universal
constant. Table 3 in Appendix A contains a high-level summary of results explored in this paper.
Overall, our results reveal a rich picture in the trade-off between fairness and utilization for this type
of allocation problem, through the different families of bounds for the price of fairness — ranging from
distributions where fairness can be achieved while maximizing utilization, to those in which the gap is
bounded by a constant, to others for which the gap can become large. The techniques used for the analysis
suggest further opportunities for reasoning about the ways in which balancing the probability of service
to different groups can both constrain and also be compatible with other objectives.
2 Motivating example
To motivate the problem and to make some of the types of calculations more clear, we start with the
following example. Suppose there is a remote stretch of coastline with two very small hamlets, A and B,
each with a small set of houses. This stretch of coastline is prone to severe localized storms that lead to
power outages. Each hamlet has a slightly different probability distribution over storms - distributions
that are known. In any particular week, the probability distribution over the number of houses C impacted
by power outages in each hamlet is as follows:
PA(C = c) =


0.6 c = 0
0.4 c = 2
0 otherwise
PB(C = c) =


0.3 c = 0
0.7 c = 3
0 otherwise
In our example, assume that each week’s power outage is independent of other weeks, and the hamlets
are far enough apart that the power outages in one hamlet aren’t correlated with the power outages in
the other. A regional planning committee has at its disposal 2 generators, each of which can restore
power to 1 house. They are trying to decide how to allocate these generators across the two hamlets.
The generators cannot be transferred from one hamlet to another after a storm strikes. If there are v
generators allocated to a hamlet and c houses in need of generators, the number of houses that receive
generators is min(v, c).
The regional planning committee first decides that it wishes to maximize utilization: the expected number
of houses in need of generators that receive them. There are three options for allocations: {(vA = 0, vB =
2), (vA = 1, vB = 1), (vA = 2, vB = 0)} where vi = j means that hamlet i gets j generators. Formally,
utilization can be written as:
U(vA = nA, vB = nB) = EC∼CA [min(C,nA)] + EC∼CB [min(C,nB)]
The utilizations across these three allocations are given in Table 1. The allocation that maximizes
utilization is (vA = 0, vB = 2).
However, something bothers the regional committee: it feels fundamentally unfair that all of the houses
that receive generators will be in hamlet B. As a way to formalize this, we could ask what fraction of houses
in need of generators obtain them, on average, and aim to select an allocation that brings this proportion
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as close to equality as possible between the two hamlets. First, we derive the relevant probability for an
arbitrary hamlet:
P (house k gets generator | house k needs generator) =
P (house k gets generator ∩ house k needs generator)
P (house k needs generator)
=
P (house k gets generator )
P (house k needs generator)
We will assume that there is a total number of houses 0 < K <∞ in the hamlet and that all houses within
the same hamlet are interchangable. The total number of houses in the hamlet who need generators is
given by C ∼ C. Given that c houses need generators, there is a cK probability that a randomly selected
house k will be one of those. Given that a house is in need of generators, the probability it obtains one
is equal to min(vc , 1).
P (house k needs generator) =
K∑
c=0
P (house k needs generator | C = c)P (C = c)
=
K∑
c=0
c
K
P (C = c) =
K∑
c=1
c
K
P (C = c)
Similarly, we can use the K term to expand out the probability P (house k gets generator)
= P (house k gets generator | house k needs generator)P (house k needs generator )
+ P (house k gets generator | house k does NOT need generator)P (house k does NOT need generator )
P (house k gets generator | house k does NOT need generator) = 0, so the above term simplifies to the
term below. Note that P (house k gets generator | house k needs generator, C = 0) = 0, which is why
the sum starts from c = 1.
K∑
c=1
P (house k gets generator|house k needs generator, C = c)P (house k needs generator |C = c)P (C = c)
=
K∑
c=1
min
(v
c
, 1
)
·
c
K
· P (C = c)
Combining these results tells us that:
P (house k gets generator )
P (house k needs generator)
=
∑K
c=1min
(
v
c , 1
)
· cK · P (C = c)∑K
c=1
c
K · P (C = c)
=
∑K
c=1min
(
v
c , 1
)
· c · P (C = c)∑K
c=1 c · P (C = c)
=
∑K
c=1min(v, c)P (C = c)∑K
c=1 c · P (C = c)
=
EC∼C min(v,C)
EC∼CC
=: q(vi, Ci)
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q(vA, CA) q(vB , CB) |q(vA, CA)− q(vB , CB)| U(vA, vB)
{vA = 0, vB = 2}
0
0.8 = 0
1.4
2.1 = 0.6 0.6 1.4
{vA = 1, vB = 1}
0.4
0.8 = 0.5
0.7
2.1 = 0.3 0.16 1.1
{vA = 2, vB = 0}
0.8
0.8 = 1
0
2.1 = 0 1 0.8
Table 2: Probability of receiving resources across two groups in motivating example. Utilization included
for reference.
where in the last step we have defined the probability of receiving the resource, conditional on needing
it, as q(vi, Ci), where i indexes the hamlet that house k is preseent in. Note that this definition differs
from Elzayn et al. (2019): that definition calculated the probability of candidates receiving the resource
weighted by each time period. By contrast, our definition is based on the per-person probability of
receiving the resource, which we believe is a more natural definition. One goal might be to bring these
probabilities across the hamlets to be as close as possible to each other.
How does each allocation considered in Table 1 do under this definition? For reference, EC∼CAC =
0.6 · 0 + 0.4 · 2 = 0.8 and EC∼CBC = 0.3 · 0 + 0.7 · 3 = 2.1. The results are shown in Table 2.
Given these numbers, the regional committee could look at the utilization and fairness values of each
allocation and make their own decision about how resources should be allocated. In particular, they
might decide that they want the q(vi, Ci) fractions between each hamlet to be within a certain difference
α and pick the allocation with maximal utilization, subject to those constraints. It is this scenario that
much of this paper will consider: comparing max-utilization with maximizing utilization subject to an
α-fairness constraint.
3 Applications and formal model
The purpose of this paper is not to provide guidance for which allocation decision-makers should choose,
but rather to provide general bounds on when this procedure will result in a large trade-off of utilization
and fairness, and when the trade-off will be smaller. One main departure from the illustrative example
is that much of this paper will focus cases with many candidates and many resources, which in the limit
will be be approximated by continuous probability distributions. We will discuss the contrasting cases of
continuous and discrete probability distributions further in later seections.
3.1 Model detail
In this section, we take the motivating example and make it more abstract. We have a set of N groups.
Each group i has a distribution Ci over the number of candidates c that are present during a particular
unit of time. We assume that
EC∼CiC > 0 ∀i ∈ [N ] and Ci ⊥⊥ Cj ∀i 6= j
and that each time period’s number of candidates is independently and identically distributed. The
distribution C could be discrete or continuous. As mentioned previously, much of this paper will focus
on the continuous probability distribution case, but the results obtained largely do not depend on this
factor.
In the model, we assume we have a numberR ∈ N of resources that we can allocate across these groups. We
assume that allocations must be selected before the number of candidates is realized each time period. If v
resources and c candidates are present a given group, then min(v, c) candidates will receive the resource. If
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v > c, some resources will go unused, and if v < c, some candidates will go without resources. We assume
that the only distinguishing characteristic candidates have is which group they come from: otherwise,
they are interchangeable.
We have two different objective functions: utilization and fairness.
Utilization: U(v, {Ci}) :=
N∑
i=1
EC∼Ci min(C, vi) s.t
∑
i
vi = R
Fairness: Q(v, {Ci}) := max
i,j
|q(vi, Ci)− q(vj , Cj)| s.t.
∑
i
vi = R with q(v, C) :=
EC∼Cmin(C, v)
EC∼CC
The fairness term bounds the difference in the probability of a candidate receiving a resource between
groups. We say an allocation v is α-fair if the fairness objective above has value α, so all q(vi, Ci) fractions
are within α of each other.
Price of Fairness (PoF) := PoF(α) =
Unconstrained utilization
Maximum utilization that is α-fair
=
maxv U(v, {Ci})
maxv U(v, {Ci}) s.t Q(v, {Ci}) ≤ α
If there exists an allocation that simultaneously maximizes utilization and is α = 0 fair, then the PoF
is 1 and there is no tension between our two objectives. Otherwise, the PoF is > 1 and we will need to
trade off between these objectives in order to make a decision about which allocation to choose. We will
use the standard notation of having f(x) represent the probability density function (or probability mass
function) and F (x) represent the cumulative distribution function of a distribution.
There are a few assumptions in this model that are important to recognize. To start, we require that any
allocation always use its entire budget R. It might be possible that an α-fair allocation might prefer to use
less than its entire budget in order to achieve fairness: this is a case that our model specifically disallows.
Secondly, our definition of fairness revolves around the maximum difference in probability of receiving
the resource. A different metric could have used the average difference in probability, for example. While
these (and other) different models might also be valid and interesting avenues to explore, the rest of this
paper will use the assumptions and model listed above.
3.2 Application areas
Despite the above motivating example, the focus of this paper is not to model any one specific application
such as disaster relief aid. Instead, we view this model as representing the core features of allocation
problems in a variety of contexts. A few of these are listed below. We note that in each case, the
potential application area will have key features that are not already captured in the above model. This
is intentional because the goal of this paper is to provide broad results for a broad class of problems,
rather than model more precisely a particular application area. Both Elzayn et al. (2019) and Ensign
et al. (2018) use related models in the contexts of allocating police officers to districts with differing crime
rates. While this is also an area of application for this model, it raises additional issues that we do not
model here, such as the possibility that the presence of police officers will have an impact on the rate of
crime.
• Doctors: As described in the introduction, one example could be allocating doctors across regions
with different probabilities of ill patients. Again, it is worth noting that the presence of doctors might
influence the level of illnesses.
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• Blood banks: Donated blood needs to be allocated across different hospitals with potentially different
needs for blood. This area has the added complication that blood donations are not interchangeable:
candidates can only receive a certain subset of the available types of blood.
• Schools: A public school district might try to allocate certain resources (teachers, computers, special-
ized classes) across schools of different size, and therefore different distributions of need.
4 General bounds on Price of Fairness
One natural question we might ask is, “What is the maximum amount of utilization we give up by
requiring fairness?”. This amount depends on the set of probabilities distributions {Ci} and our budget
R. If we have these quantities, we can directly calculate the PoF by first calculating the unconstrained
max-utilization, then the α-fair max-utilization. Elzayn et al. (2019) provides algorithms to calculate
both of these quantities so long as the allocations are integers. However, in many cases we might not
know the specific {Ci} in advance, but we might still want to have a bound on the PoF. In this section,
we explore general bounds on the PoF when we do not know the candidate distributions in advance.
4.1 Discrete resource allocation has unbounded PoF
Suppose we allocate resources in integer units: for example, one generator at a time. In this formulation,
we find that the PoF is unbounded: achieving α fairness could require giving up arbitrarily large amounts
of utilization. This proof is presented in detail in the Appendix, a rough sketch is below.
Suppose we are given a desired α < 1 and a maximum PoF ρ we are willing to accept. (We require α < 1
because if α = 1 the fairness constraint has no effect, so the PoF will be 1 always.) Then, it is possible
to construct a set of candidate distributions {Ci} and a set of resources R over this such that the PoF is
> ρ. The proof involves creating two different candidate distributions with parameters depending on α
and ρ and then showing that the PoF of allocating resources across those groups is always > ρ.
4.2 PoF bounded by 1/α under fractional allocation
A critical reader might wonder about the PoF if we were allowed to allocate resources fractionally. Such
allocations would offer more flexibility and might allow for lower PoF. In the motivating example of
allocating generators across hamlets, for example, this might correspond to allocating 0.7 generators to
Hamlet A and 1.3 generators to Hamlet B. For divisible resources (such as potable water stores), this type
of allocation makes intuitive sense. For indivisible resources, like generators, we can view the allocation
as probabalistic: An allocation of v = 1.3, for example, could be viewed as
P (V = v) =


0.7 v = 1
0.3 v = 2
0 otherwise
The expected utilization is equal to EV∼VEC∼Cmin(V,C). Both the “deterministic, fractional” and “prob-
abilistic, integer-valued” interpretations result in the same expected utilization. This fact is proved in the
Appendix. Given the results of this lemma, we will switch between these two interpretations (probabalistic
and deterministic) depending on which makes more sense for the problem at hand.
Given the ability to allocate resources fractionally, we will find that the PoF is no longer unbounded. In
particular, the PoF is upper bounded by 1α . Note that this proof relies on an algorithm to calculate a
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max-utilizing allocation in the fractional case, as well as other related proofs, all present in this paper’s
Appendix.
Theorem 1. Given a set of candidate distributions {Ci}, level of resources R, and ability to allocate
resources fractionally, it is possible to find an α-fair allocation with PoF at most 1α , though this allocation
may not use all of the resources.
Proof. First, we find a max-utilization allocation. Next, we divide the groups into two categories:
A = {i | q(vi, Ci) > α} B = {i | q(vi, Ci) ≤ α}
If A = ∅, then the max-utilization allocation is already α-fair and PoF = 1 < 1α . Otherwise, modify the
allocation vi → v
′
i for each i ∈ A so q(v
′
i, Ci) = α exactly. We are able to do this because we know that
q(vi, Ci) is continuous and increases monotonically from 0 to 1.
This new allocation is α-fair: q(vi, Ci) ≤ α. It uses at most the same amount of resources that the optimal
allocation used so it is achievable. The only case where it uses exactly the same amount of resources is
when A is the empty set. For i ∈ A, we know that:
q(v′i, Ci) = α =
EC [min(C, v
′
i)]
EC [C]
⇒ EC
[
min(C, v′i)
]
= α · EC[C] ≥ α · EC [min(C, vi)]
This tells us that the utilization of the groups in A greater than or equal to αmultiplied by the utilization of
the unconstrained maximum utilization. The utilization of groups in B are identical to their unconstrained
utilization. Then
PoF =
∑
i∈A ECmin(C, vi) +
∑
i∈B ECmin(C, vi)∑
i∈A ECmin(C, v
′
i) +
∑
i∈B ECmin(C, vi)
≤
∑
i∈A ECmin(C, vi) +
∑
i∈B ECmin(C, vi)
α ·
∑
i∈A ECmin(C, vi) +
∑
i∈B ECmin(C, vi)
≤
∑
i∈A ECmin(C, vi)
α ·
∑
i∈A ECmin(C, vi)
=
1
α
where the inequality in the second to last step comes from the fact that B could be the empty set.
Note that we have required that all allocations use all of the resources, so we will need to convert the
allocation calculated above into one with
∑
i vi = R. The supporting lemma below (proved in the
Appendix) provides this final step.
Lemma 1. If there exists a fractional allocation v over candidate distributions {C} such that
∑
i vi =
V ′ < R that is α-fair, there also exists an allocation v′ that is α-fair and has utilization at least as large
as v, but additionally has the property that
∑
i vi = R .
Taken together, these two lemmas show that, for every optimal allocation, we can find an allocation
that is α-fair, uses all of the resources R, and has PoF less that 1α . This tells us that the PoF for the
max-utilization α-fair allocation could be at most 1α .
4.3 PoF unbounded for α = 0 under fractional allocation
However, this 1α bound is undefined for α = 0. The proof below shows that we can achieve arbitrarily
high PoF with only n = 2 groups, even in the case where we increase the budget R by a constant factor
in the α = 0 case.
8
4.3 Fractional allocation unbounded 4 GENERAL BOUNDS ON PRICE OF FAIRNESS
Lemma 2. Suppose that in the case requiring α = 0 allocation, the budget R is multiplied by k ≥ 1. For
any ρ > 1, we can create a set of n = 2 groups such that requiring α = 0 fairness involves a PoF > ρ,
assuming fractional allocation of resources.
Proof. We have 2 groups, one with distribution C1 and one with distribution C2, described below:
Ci ∼ C1 P (Ci = c) =


1− p1 c = 0
p1 c = n1
0 otherwise
Ci ∼ C2 P (Ci = c) =


1− p2 c = 0
p2 c = n2
0 otherwise
Set 0 < p1 < 1, p2 =
p1
n1
, n2 = n
2
1, and n1 > 2k · ρ− 1. Finally, set R = n1.
Because p1 > p2, candidates are more likely to be present in Group 1, so the optimal allocation is
v1 = n2, v2 = 0.
The α = 0 fair allocation has q(v1, C1) = q(v2, C2). In the case that vi ≤ ni, the q probabilities can be
calculated as follows:
q(vi, Ci) =
ECi min(vi, C)
ECiC
=
vi · pi
ni · pi
=
vi
ni
As stated above, this equation only holds for vi ≤ ni. If vi > ni, q(vi, Ci) = 1 always. However, we must
have vi ≤ ni in the α = 0 fair allocation: we have insufficient resources to have q(v1, C1) = q(v2, C2) = 1.
This implies that:
v1
n2
=
v2
n2
v1 + v2 = k ·R = k · n1
where we have incoporated the fact that the budget is k times larger. The solution to this system of
equations is:
v1 =
k · n1
n1 + n2
· n1 v2 =
k · n1
n1 + n2
· n2
This gives us a PoF as follows:
PoF =
p1 · n1
k·n1
n1+n2
· n1 · p1 +
k·n1
n1+n2
· n2 · p2
=
p1
k·n1
n1+n2
· p1 +
k·n2
n1+n2
· p2
=
p1
k·n1
n1+n21
· p1 +
k·n2
1
n1+n21
· p2
where we have used the fact that n2 = n
2
1. Continuing simplifying gives us:
PoF =
p1
k·n1
n1+n21
· (p1 + n1 · p2)
=
p1
k
1+n1
· (p1 + n1 · p2)
=
p1 · (1 + n1)
k (p1 + n1 · p2)
Using the facts that, p2 =
p1
n1
and n1 > 2k · ρ− 1, the bound becomes:
PoF =
p1 · (1 + n1)
2k · p1
=
1 + n1
2k
>
1 + 2k · ρ− 1
2k
= ρ
as desired.
Note that in the proof above p1 is left as a free parameter. In particular, it could be set to something
decreasing in ρ, such as 1ρ , which would create an example with tail probabilities decreasing in ρ, but still
PoF greater than ρ.
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5 PoF equal to 1 for certain families of distributions
The previous section showed that with fractional allocation, the upper bound on the Price of Fairness
is 1α . This could still be a fairly large price to pay: if the desired level of fairness is α = 0.1, this could
mean we might be obliged to reduce utilization by 90% in order to achieve the desired level of equity.
Depending on the context, this could be a very high price. However, the upper bound obtained in the
previous section was derived without any reliance on the characteristics of the candidate distributions {C}.
In this section, we will show that for certain reasonable distributions, the Price of Fairness is much lower.
In some cases, the max-utilization allocation is already α = 0 fair!
5.1 Illustrative example for exponential distribution
First, we will work out an example illustrating this phenomenon for N = 2 groups, both with exponential
distributions. As proved in the Appendix, there exists only one max-utilizing allocation, which is the one
that has F1(v1) = F2(v2) = τ , with v1 + v2 = R. This implies:
1− e−λ1·v1 = 1− e−λ1·(R−v1) ⇒ v1 =
λ2
λ1 + λ2
· R and v2 =
λ1
λ1 + λ2
·R
This allocation is max-utilizing. We will also show that it is α = 0 fair, which means that PoF = 1. To
do this, we will calculate qi(vi) for both groups.
q(v) =
∫ v
0 c · f(c)dc+ v · (1− F (v))
EC∼exp(λ)C
=
∫ v
0 c · λe
−λcdx+ v · e−λv
1
λ
=
1
λ ·
(
1− e−λ·v
)
1
λ
= 1− e−λ·v
q(v1, C1) = q(v2, C2) because
1− e
−λ1·
λ2
λ1+λ2
·R
= 1− e
−λ2·
λ1
λ1+λ2
·R
This demonstrates that, for the given scenario, the max-utilizing allocation already satisfies α = 0 fairness.
This result is true more broadly than just in this illustrative example. In the next section, we will describe
a property of probability distributions such that the max-utilizing allocation is also α = 0 fair.
5.2 Proof of general property
Theorem 2. Consider a set of continuous candidate distributions with Fi(0) = 0 and fi(v) > 0 ∀v ≥ 0.
Then, suppose the set of candidate distributions {Ci} has the following property:
Fi(v) = Fj
(
v ·
EC∼Cj [C]
EC∼Ci [C]
)
∀v ∈ [0,∞) ∀i, j
Then under fractional allocation of resources, the max-utilization allocation is already α = 0 fair. In other
words,
Fi(vi) = Fj(vj) ⇒
EC∼Ci min(C, vi)
EC∼Ci [C]
=
EC∼Cj min(C, vj)
EC∼Cj [C]
∀i, j
Intuitively, this property means that the CDFs of all of the candidate distributions {Ci} are versions of
the same function, scaled by the ratio of their expected values. If this property holds, it will turn out
mathematically that the max-utilizing allocation is already α = 0 fair.
First, we can verify that the exponential distribution satisfies these properties. The exponential distribu-
tion has the given expectation and CDF:
EC∼Cj [C] =
1
λj
EC∼Ci [C] =
1
λi
Fj(v) = 1− e
−λj ·v
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Substitution shows that the premise of the lemmas above holds
EC∼Cj [C]
EC∼Ci [C]
=
λi
λj
⇒ Fj
(
v ·
EC∼Cj [C]
EC∼Ci [C]
)
= 1− e
−λj ·v·
λi
λj = 1− e−λi·v = Fi(v)
Next, we will explore why this property of probability distributions leads to PoF = 1.
As shown in the Appendix, the max-utilization allocation has the property that
• Fi(vi) > τ only if Fi(0) ≥ τ . In this case, vi = 0.
• Fi(vi) = τ otherwise.
We assume Fi(0) = 0, so vi > 0 ∀i. We additionally require fi(v) > 0 ∀v ≥ 0, which tells us that there
exists only one max-utilizing allocation. Next, we examine the fairness constraint and rewrite it as:
EC∼Ci [C | C ≤ vi] · Pi(C ≤ vi) + vi · Pi(C > vi)
EC∼C [C]
=
EC∼Cj [C | C ≤ vj] · Pj(C ≤ vj) + vj · Pj(C > vj)
EC∼Cj [C]
∀i, j
We will find it convenient to rewrite this as:
EC∼Ci [C | C ≤ vi] · Pi(C ≤ vi)
EC∼Ci [C]
+
vi · Pi(C > vi)
EC∼Ci [C]
=
EC∼Cj [C | C ≤ vj ] · Pj(C ≤ vj)
EC∼Cj [C]
+
vj · Pj(C > vj)
EC∼Cj [C]
∀i, j
For notational convenience, we denotemij =
EC∼Ci
[C]
EC∼Cj
[C] . We will prove this theorem by considering subterms
of each side independently and proving that they are equal.
Lemma 3.
Fi(v) = Fj
(
v
mij
)
∀v ∈ [0,∞) ∀i, j ⇒
v · Pi(C > v)
EC∼Ci [C]
=
v
mij
· Pj
(
C > vmij
)
EC∼Cj [C]
∀v ∈ [0,∞) ∀i, j
Proof.
v
mij
· Pj
(
C > vmij
)
EC∼Cj [C]
=
v
mij
· Pi(C > v)
EC∼Cj [C]
=
v · Pi(C > v)
mij · EC∼Cj [C]
=
v · Pi(C > v)
EC∼Ci [C]
where the first step comes from the fact that Pj(C >
v
mij
) = 1− Fj(
v
mij
) = 1− Fi(v) = Pi(C > v)
The max-utilizing allocation has the property that Fi(vi) = Fj(vj). Having the additional property that
Fi(v) = Fj
(
v
mij
)
implies that vj =
vi
mij
. Because the statement of the above lemma holds ∀v, it also
holds for vi, which implies that
Fi(vi) = Fj(vj) ⇒
vi · Pi(C > vi)
EC∼Ci [C]
=
vj · Pj (C > vj)
EC∼Cj [C]
Next, we consider the second subterm in the equality:
Lemma 4.
Fi(v) = Fj
(
v
mij
)
⇒
EC∼Ci [C | C ≤ vi] · Pi(C ≤ vi)
EC∼Ci [C]
=
EC∼Cj [C | C ≤ vj] · Pj(C ≤ vi)
EC∼Cj [C]
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Proof. What is E[C | C < v] written out in terms of the CDF of a distribution? We will consider
C | C < v as a different probability distribution. It has PDF and CDF as shown below:
f∗(t) =
{
f(t)
F (v) 0 ≤ t ≤ v
0 otherwise
F ∗(t) =
{
F (t)
F (v) 0 ≤ t ≤ v
1 otherwise
Then, we can rewrite one of the terms above as:
E[C | C < v] =
∫ ∞
0
(1− F ∗(t))dt =
∫ v
0
(1− F ∗(t))dt =
∫ v
0
(
1−
F (t)
F (v)
)
dt = v −
1
F (v)
∫ v
0
F (t)dt
We will use this fact to evaluate the following term, substituting vmij as the input v:
EC∼Cj [C | C ≤ v] · Fj
(
v
mij
)
EC∼Cj [C]
=

 v
mij
−
∫ v/mij
0 Fj(t)dt
Fj
(
v
mij
)

 Fj
(
v
mij
)
EC∼Cj [C]
=

v · Fj
(
v
mij
)
−mij ·
∫ v/mij
0 Fj(t)dt
mij · Fj
(
v
mij
)

 Fj
(
v
mij
)
EC∼Cj [C]
=
v · Fj
(
v
mij
)
−mij
∫ v/mij
0 Fj(t)dt
mij · EC∼Cj [C]
=
v · Fi(v)−mij
∫ v/mij
0 Fj(t)dt
EC∼Ci [C]
where we have used the assumption of equality in the CDFs in the last step. Next, we note that
Fj(t) = Fi(g(t)) where g(t) = mij · t
By the reverse chain rule, ∫ b
a
f ′ (g (t)) · g′(t)dt = [f(g(t))]ba
g′(t) = mij, so if we denote the anti-derivative of Fi by Hi, then∫ v/mij
0
Fj(t) ·mij dt =
∫ v/mij
0
Fi(g(t)) ·mij dt = [Hi(g(t))]
v/mij
0 = [Hi(mij · t)]
v/mij
0 = Hi(v) −Hi(0)
= [Hi(t)]
v
0 =
∫ v
0
Fi(t)dt
This allows us to rewrite the item above as
v · Fi(v)−
∫ v
0 Fi(t)dt
EC∼Ci [C]
This gives us a value for the righthand side of the equality we are trying to show. For the lefthand side,
we can use results of our previous analysis of E[C | C < v] to find that:
EC∼Ci [C | C ≤ v] · Fi(v)
EC∼Ci [C]
=
(
v −
1
Fi(v)
∫ v
0
Fi(t)dt
)
·
Fi(v)
EC∼Ci [C]
=
v · Fi(v)−
∫ v
0 Fi(t)dt
EC∼Ci [C]
So the two terms are equivalent.
Taken together, these two lemmas tell us that
Fi(v) = Fj
(
v
mij
)
∀v ∈ [0,∞) ⇒
EC∼Ci min(C, vi)
EC∼Ci [C]
=
EC∼Cj min(C, vj)
EC∼Cj [C]
∀i, j
so any max-utilization allocation is already α = 0 fair.
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5.3 Distributions that satisfy the given premise
We have previously shown that exponential distributions satisfy the given premise, which is perhaps not
very surprising. Exponential distributions have certain nice properties: they are memoryless, for example,
and are not heavy-tailed. At first guess, it could be reasonable to guess that this phenomenon of PoF
equal to 1 is only present in exponential distributions.
However, there exist further families of distributions that also satisfy the premise above and therefore have
PoF equal to 1; these include Weibull distributions with the same k parameter. They have expectation
and CDF as given below:
EC∼Cj [C] = λj · Γ
(
1 +
1
k
)
EC∼Ci [C] = λi · Γ
(
1 +
1
k
)
Fj(v) = 1− e
−
(
v
λj
)k
Again, substitution shows that the premise of the above lemmas holds:
EC∼Cj [C]
EC∼Ci [C]
=
λj
λi
⇒ Fj
(
v ·
EC∼Cj [C]
EC∼Ci [C]
)
= 1− e
−
(
v
λj
·
λj
λi
)k
= 1− e
−
(
v
λi
)k
= Fi(v)
Thus, the Theorem proved in this section shows that Weibull distributions with the same k parameter
have PoF = 1. This result is somewhat surprising, given that Weibull distributions in general have fewer
nice properties than exponential distributions. However, Weibull distributions, along with power law
distributions, which will be discussed in the next section, tend to be better models of real-life phenom-
ena. For example, natural disasters and terrorist attacks are commonly believed to follow heavy-tailed
distributions in severity [9] [10]. This result shows us that there are plausibly realistic models of natural
phenomena that have no tradeoff between fair and max-utilizing allocations.
6 PoF bounded by small constant for power law distribution
So far, Section 4 has shown that PoF can be arbitrarily large, and Section 5 has shown that multiple
distributions have PoF = 1. A next logical step is to explore probability distributions with small gaps
between the max-utilizing and α-fair max utilizing allocations. Specifically, we consider power law dis-
tributions. There are multiple distributions that are commonly described as “power law” distributions.
The one we will use, also called the “Lomax distribution”, has PDF and CDF as below. Note that it has
support for all x ≥ 0 and a parameter b > 1 controlling the shape of the distribution.
fC(v) =
b
(v + 1)b+1
FC(v) = 1−
1
(1 + v)b
EC[C] =
1
b− 1
Theorem 3. Set the number of groups N to some constant h. Then, the Price of Fairness from allocating
R resources across these groups is upper bounded by
h ·Hh
where Hh is the hth harmonic number.
Note that this bound is independent of the fairness parameter α as well as the budget R and any param-
eters bi.
We will prove this theorem by breaking it up into several smaller lemmas. For convenience, we order the
groups so that b1 ≥ b2 . . . ≥ bh. First, we write out the full PoF term:
PoF =
Unconstrained max-utilization
Utilization constrained to be α-fair
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=
∫ v1
0 x · f1(x)dx+ v1 · (1− F1(v1)) + . . . +
∫ vh
0 x · fh(x)dx+ vh · (1− Fh(vh))∫ v′
1
0 x · f1(x)dx+ v
′
1 · (1− F1(v
′
1)) + . . . +
∫ v′
h
0 x · fh(x)dx+ v
′
h · (1− Fh(v
′
h))
Note that because the power law distribution has positive support everywhere in the space we are con-
sidering (v ≥ 0), it has a unique max-utilizing allocation and α-fair max-utilizing allocation. The PoF is
largest when α = 0, so that is the case we will upper-bound.
Lemma 5. For the unconstrained max-utilization allocation terms, vi ≤
R
h−i+1 ∀i.
Proof. As proved in the Appendix, the max-utilizing allocation {vi} has the property that Fi(vi) = Fj(vj)
∀ i, j. For the power law distributions, this implies:
1
(1 + vi)bi
=
1
(1 + vj)bj
⇒ (1 + vi)
bi = (1 + vj)
bj
For bi ≤ bj , this implies vi ≥ vj . This tells us that v1 ≤ v2 . . . ≤ vh. Any max-utilizing allocation
over power law distributions of this form must use the entire resource R: because the support of the
distribution continues to ∞, any allocation using R − ǫ resources can be strictly improved by allocating
the remaining ǫ resources. This tells us that v1 + v2 + . . . vh = R.
We can prove the upper bound by working backwards from h. vh ≤ R because the allocation to any one
group cannot exceed the total amount of resources available. vh−1 ≤ vh and together both of them cannot
sum to more than R, so vh−1 ≤
R
2 . Similarly, for any vi, vi ≤ vi+1 ≤ . . . vh, with vi + vi+1 + . . . vh ≤ R,
so vi ≤
R
h−i+1 .
Lemma 6. For the α-fair allocation term, v′h ≥
R
h .
Proof. As proved in the Appendix, any α-fair allocation vi with
∑
i vi < R can be increased to v
′
i
with∑
i v
′
i = R and is also α-fair. This tells us that the α-fair max-utilizing allocation must use all of the
resources, so v′1 + v
′
2 + . . . v
′
h = R. Under the definition of q(v, C),
q(vi, Ci) =
∫ v
0 x · f(x)dx+ v · (1− F (v))
EC∼CC
=
1−b·v·(v+1)−b−(v+1)−b
b−1 + v · (v + 1)
−b
1
b−1
= 1−
1
(v + 1)b−1
For α = 0, we must have:
∀i, j q(v′i, Ci) = q(v
′
j , Cj) ⇒ 1−
1
(v′i + 1)
bi−1
= 1−
1
(v′j + 1)
bj−1
⇒ (v′i + 1)
bi−1 = (v′j + 1)
bj−1
For bi ≥ bj , this implies v
′
i ≤ v
′
j . Given that we have h terms that sum up to R and v
′
h is the largest of
them, we must have v′h ≥
R
h .
Lemma 7. The α-fair max-utilizing allocation can be rewritten entirely in terms of vh:(∫ v′1
0
x · f1(x)dx+ v
′
1 · (1− F1(v
′
1))
)
+ . . .+
(∫ v′
h
0
x · fh(x)dx+ v
′
h(1− Fh(v
′
h))
)
= (bh − 1) ·
(
h∑
i=1
1
bi − 1
)
·
(∫ v′
h
0
x · fh(x)dx+ v
′
h · (1− Fh(v
′
h))
)
14
6 POWER LAW
Proof. The α = 0 fairness is equivalent to the following, as noted in the previous lemma:∫ v′i
0 x · fi(x)dx + v
′
i · (1− Fi(v
′
i))
1
bi−1
=
∫ v′
h
0 x · fh(x)dx+ v
′
h · (1− Fh(v
′
h))
1
bh−1
which can be rewritten as:∫ v′i
0
x · fi(x)dx + v
′
i
(
1− Fi(v
′
i)
)
=
bh − 1
bi − 1
(∫ v′
h
0
x · fh(x)dx+ v
′
h(1− Fh(v
′
h))
)
Because this was done for an arbitrary i, we can use this result to rewrite the entire sum in terms of
vh.
The above lemma allows us to rewrite the entire PoF term:
PoF =
∫ v1
0 x · f1(x)dx+ v1 · (1− F1(v1)) + . . .+
∫ vh
0 x · fh(x)dx+ vh · (1− Fh(vh))
(bh − 1) ·
(∑h
i=1
1
bi−1
)(∫ v′
h
0 x · fh(x)dx+ v
′
h · (1− Fh(v
′
h))
)
Next, our approach for bounding the PoF will be to bound each term within the numerator’s sum inde-
pendently.
Lemma 8.
PoFh :=
∫ vh
0 x · fh(x)dx + vh · (1− Fh(vh))
(bh − 1) ·
(∑h
i=1
1
bi−1
)(∫ v′
h
0 x · fh(x)dx+ v
′
h · (1− Fh(v
′
h))
) ≤ h
Proof. We can apply Lemmas 5 and 6 to obtain vh ≤ R and v
′
h ≥
R
h . We additionally use the fact that∫ v
0
x · fi(x)dx+ v · (1− Fi(v)) =
1
bi − 1
(
1−
1
(1 + v)bi−1
)
=
1
bi − 1
q(v, Ci)
These facts combined allow us to rewrite the equation we are interested in bounding as:
PoFh ≤
1
bh−1
(
1− 1
(1+R)bh−1
)
(bh − 1) ·
(∑h
j=1
1
bj−1
)
· 1bh−1
(
1− 1
(1+Rh )
bh−1
) = 1− 1(1+R)bh−1
(bh − 1) ·
(∑h
j=1
1
bj−1
)
·
(
1− 1
(1+Rh )
bh−1
)
In over to over-bound PoFh, we under-bound the fraction in the denominator:
(bh − 1) ·
(
h∑
i=1
1
bi − 1
)
≥ 1
to obtain:
PoFh ≤
1− 1
(1+R)bh−1
1− 1
(1+Rh )
bh−1
At R = 0, this fraction is undefined. We denote the numerator as s, the denominator as t, and use
L’Hoˆpital’s rule to investigate the limit as R→ 0:
s′ = (bh − 1)
1
(1 +R)bh
t′ =
bh − 1
h
1(
1 + Rh
)bh
As R→ 0, s′ → bh − 1 and t
′ → bh−1h , so
s′
t′ → h, which tells us that PoFh → h as R→ 0.
Next, we will show that PoFh is decreasing in R, showing that h is an upper bound on PoFh everywhere.
To do this, we will use L’Hoˆpital’s Monotone rule [11], which states the following:
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Lemma 9. Given −∞ < a < c < ∞, and s, t continuous functions differentiable on (a, c) with s(a) =
t(a) = 0 or s(c) = t(c) = 0 and g(x) 6= 0 ∀x ∈ (a, c), then if s
′
t′ is increasing (decreasing) on (a, c), then
s
t
is also increasing (decreasing).
The functions in PoFh satisfy this rule: s, t are both continuous and differentiable, and for a = 0,
s(a) = t(a) = 0. Using this rule:
s′
t′
=
(bh − 1)
1
(1+R)bh
bh−1
h
1
(1+Rh )
bh
=
h ·
(
1 + Rh
)bh
(1 +R)bh
= h ·
(
1 + Rh
1 +R
)bh
This term is decreasing in R because the denominator 1+R is increasing faster than the numerator 1+ Rh
is increasing. This tells us that s
′
t′ is decreasing in R, so PoFh is decreasing as well. The upper bound of
R = 0 is an upper bound for all of PoFh.
Next, we consider a bound for any i 6= h.
Lemma 10. For i ∈ [h− 1],
PoFi :=
∫ vi
0 x · fi(x)dx+ vi(1 − Fi(vi))
(bh − 1) ·
(∑h
j=1
1
bj−1
)(∫ v′
h
0 x · fh(x)dx+ v
′
h(1− Fh(v
′
h))
) ≤ h
h− i+ 1
Proof. We use Lemmas 5 and 6 to get vi ≤
R
h−i+1 and v
′
h ≥
R
h . We again rewrite the equation as:
1
bi−1
(
1− 1
(1+ Rh−i+1)
bi−1
)
(bh − 1) ·
(∑h
j=1
1
bj−1
)
· 1bh−1
(
1− 1
(1+Rh )
bh−1
) = 1−
1
(1+ Rh−i+1)
bi−1
(bi − 1) ·
(∑h
j=1
1
bj−1
)
·
(
1− 1
(1+Rh )
bh−1
)
<
1− 1
(1+ Rh−i+1)
bi−1(
bi−1
bh−1
+ 1
)
·
(
1− 1
(1+Rh )
bh−1
)
At R = 0, this is again undefined. Using the same process of rewriting the fraction as st , we get
s′ =
bi − 1
h− i+ 1
1(
1 + Rh−i+1
)bi t′ = bh − 1 + bi − 1h 1(1 + Rh )bh
Using L’Hoˆpital’s rule again, as R→ 0, s
′
t′ goes to a ratio of:
bi−1
h−i+1
bh−1+bi−1
h
=
bi − 1
bh − 1 + bi − 1
·
h
h− i+ 1
=
1
bh−1
bi−1
+ 1
·
h
h− i+ 1
bh−1
bi−1
is decreasing in bi, so this overall term is increasing in bi. bi →∞ upper-bounds this fraction by
1
0 + 1
·
h
h− i+ 1
=
h
h− i+ 1
which provides the limit as R→ 0. Again, we use L’Hoˆpital’s Montone rule to show that st is decreasing
in R and that the R = 0 upper bound is sufficient ∀R.
s′
t′
=
bi−1
h−i+1
1
(1+ Rh−i+1)
bi
bh−1+bi−1
h
1
(1+Rh )
bh
=
bi − 1
h− i+ 1
·
h
bh − 1 + bi − 1
·
(
1 + Rh
)bh(
1 + Rh−i+1
)bi
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The term in the denominator has a base that grows more quickly in R (because 1 + Rh−i+1 increases in
R faster than 1 + Rh ) and a larger exponent (because bi ≥ bh). Because of this, the denominator grows
more quickly in R, so s
′
t′ is decreasing in R. L’Hoˆpital’s Monotone rule tells us that
s
t is decreasing in R
as well, and so the over bound at R = 0 is an over bound for the entire function.
These lemmas, taken together, tell us that the overall PoF is bounded by:
h+
h−1∑
i=1
[
h
h− i+ 1
]
= h ·Hh
where Hh denotes the hth harmonic number.
We also investigated this bound empirically, through directly calculating the PoF for groups with different
power law distributions and found that the PoF is typically much lower than this theoretical bound,
frequently around 1.1. This result tells us that, in general, the most max-utilizing allocations are already
very close in utilization to α = 0 fair solutions.
7 Conclusion
In this work we have considered a resource allocation problem that was analyzed in terms of fairness
properties in the recent literature [6]. Starting from a set of open questions around the relationship
between fair allocations and maximum-utilization allocations, we obtained upper bounds on the gap
between the utilization of optimal and fair solutions — formalized as the price of fairness (PoF). In
addition to bounds for general distributions, we showed that a number of natural families of distributions
exhibit no gap at all — there exist optimal allocations that also achieve perfect fairness guarantees —
and we established constant upper bounds for power-law distributions.
There are a number of interesting further directions suggested by this work. To begin with, it would be
interesting to try characterizing the set of distributions for which the price of fairness is equal to 1; this is
a fundamental distributional property that applies more broadly than it initially appears. It would also
be valuable to extend the set of distributions for which we have the techniques to prove constant upper
bounds on the price of fairness.
Additionally, future work could explore different definitions of fairness. If we consider models where
candidates are not interchangable and persist from one time state to another, it might be considered
more “fair” to allocate resources preferentially to those who have been waiting longest for resources.
Finally, the model so far largely assumes a fixed amount of resources. In some cases, though, the amount
of resources could be increased or decreased and it could be enlightening to consider how modifying the
availability of resources might impact the tradeoff between utilization and fairness. By developing a
richer understanding of the behavior of different classes of distributions in this model, we can further our
understanding of the interplay between fairness and utilization when we allocate resources with this type
of uncertainty.
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A Summary table
Table 3 displays a high-level summary of the results of this paper.
B Supplementary lemmas
Lemma 11. Under integer allocation of resources, for any desired level of fairness α < 1 and any desired
PoF ρ, we can create a set of N groups, candidate distributions across these groups {Ci}, and a level of
resources R such that the PoF is greater than ρ.
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Discrete candidate probability
distribution
Continuous candidate probability
distribution
Discrete
resource
allocation
• This situation is the main focus of
Elzayn et al. [6].
• Appendix C uses an example of
this type to show unbounded PoF
for discrete allocation in general.
• Ganchev et al. [7] provides a
greedy allocation algorithm for
this situation.
Fractional
resource
allocation
• Section 4 uses an example of this
type to show that the PoF can be
arbitrarily large for α = 0 in frac-
tional allocation case.
• Appendix C shows that an algo-
rithm from Ganchev et al. [7] re-
turns the max-utilizing allocation
in this siutation.
• Appendix C provides an algo-
rithm to calculate a max-utilizing
allocation in this situation.
• Section 5 shows that exponential
& Weibull distributions have PoF
= 1 in this situation.
• Section 6 shows that power law
distributions have PoF equal to a
small constant in this situation.
Results for both discrete & continuous distributions:
• Section 4 shows that ∀ α > 0, it is possible to create an
α-fair allocation with PoF ≤ 1/α.
Table 3: Summary of results
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Proof. We will use the inputs α and ρ to design a set of candidate distributions such that PoF will be > ρ.
The building block of this proof will be two distinct kinds of candidate distributions. Both are discrete
and deterministic.
Ci ∼ Chigh P (Ci = c) =
{
1 c = n
0 otherwise
Ci ∼ Clow P (Ci = c) =
{
1 c = n′
0 otherwise
We will set the parameters based on the input values: set n =
⌈
1
α
⌉
and n′ =
⌊
1
α
⌋
if 1α is not an integer and
1
α − 1 if it is. Note that this implies that n ≥
1
α and n
′ < 1α . We will find it useful to define a parameter
m′ to be any integer such that
m′ > ρ ·
α(1 + α)
1− α
As a reminder, 0 ≤ α < 1, ρ ≥ 1 so this number is always positive. We will set the total number of
resources to be equal to
R = n+ n′ ·m′
Finally, we will set {Ci} so that we have 1 of the Chigh groups and m = R + 1 of the Clow groups, for
N = R+ 2 overall.
Next, we calculate the PoF. Under max-utilization allocation, we have sufficient resources to have R
candidates receive the resource. One allocation that achieves this upper bound is to put n resources in
the Chigh group and n
′ resources in each of m′ of the Clow groups.
Next, we consider α-fair allocation. N = R + 2 > R, so we have insufficient resources to put 1 resource
in each group. This means that the probability of a candidate receiving the resource will be 0 for some
group, so the probability of a candidate receiving the resource in any group must be ≤ α.
By construction, putting 1 resource in any of the Clow groups means that a candidate has a
1
n′ > α chance
of receiving the resource, so a max-utilizing fair allocation must have 0 resources at each of the Clow
groups. The highest allocation to Chigh that has q(vi, Chigh) ≤ α is ⌊αn⌋.
The PoF is:
n+m′ · n′
⌊αn⌋
We will place a lower bound of ρ on the overall fraction by putting a lower bound on the numerator and
an upper bound on the denominator. For the lower bound on the numerator, we have:
n+m′ · n′ ≥
1
α
+m′ · n′ ≥
1
α
+m′ ·
(
1
α
− 1
)
>
1
α
+ ρ ·
α · (1 + α)
1− α
·
(
1
α
− 1
)
We can simplify the overall terms and strategically rewrite:
1
α
+ ρ ·
α · (1 + α)
1− α
·
1− α
α
=
1
α
+ ρ · (1 + α) =
1
α
(1 + ρ · α · (1 + α))
For an upper bound on the denominator, we know that:
⌊αn⌋ ≤ α · n = α
⌈
1
α
⌉
< α ·
(
1
α
+ 1
)
= α+ 1
where the last inequality comes from the fact that ⌈ 1α⌉ <
1
α + 1. Recombining the fractions, we get:
PoF >
1
α (1 + ρ · α · (1 + α))
α+ 1
>
1
α [α · ρ · (1 + α)]
α+ 1
= ρ
So the PoF is strictly greater than ρ, as desired. This result shows that for any PoF level ρ, we can
construct a set of candidate distributions with a higher PoF, so the PoF is unbounded.
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Lemma 12. The probability of service function q(v, {C}) is continuous.
Proof. We work directly from the formal definition of continuity, which is that:
∀ǫ > 0 ∃δ > 0 s.t. |x− y| < δ ⇒ |f(x)− f(y)| < ǫ
We restrict our attention to the case of a single group: the finite sum of continuous functions is continuous,
so proving continuity for a single group is sufficient to prove that the overall utilization function is
continuous. The utilization function is EC∼C min(C,v)
EC∼C [C]
.
We first consider the case of discrete C. If we are trying to prove continuity at a particular point v, we
pick δ < ǫ · EC∼C [C]. We additionally require ⌊v⌋ = ⌊v + δ⌋. This is always possible if we make δ small
enough: if v is an integer, then any δ < 1 works. If v is not an integer, then there is some positive distance
d between it and the next integer. Then, any δ < d will work. Then q(v + δ, C)− q(v, C) is equal to
1
EC∼C [C]
·



⌊v+δ⌋∑
c=0
c · P (C = c) + (v + δ)P (c > ⌊v + δ⌋)

 −

 ⌊v⌋∑
c=0
c · P (C = c) + v · P (C > ⌊v⌋)




=
1
EC∼C [C]
· (v + δ − v)P (C > ⌊v⌋) < ǫ · EC∼C [C] ·
1
EC∼C [C]
· P (C > ⌊v⌋) ≤ ǫ
Next, we consider the continuous C case:
q(v+δ, C)−q(v, C) =
1
EC∼C [C]
·
((∫ v+δ
0
c · f(c)dc+ (v + δ)
∫ ∞
v+δ
f(c)dc
)
−
(∫ v
0
c · f(c)dc + v
∫ ∞
v
f(c)dc
))
=
1
EC∼C [C]
·
(∫ v+δ
v
c · f(c)dc+ (v + δ)
∫ ∞
v+δ
f(c)dc− v
∫ ∞
v
f(c)dc
)
We add and subtract δ ·
∫ v+δ
v f(c)dc.
=
1
EC∼C [C]
·
(∫ v+δ
v
c · f(c)dc + (v + δ)
∫ ∞
v+δ
f(c)dc− v
∫ ∞
v
f(c)dc+ δ ·
∫ v+δ
v
f(c)dc− δ ·
∫ v+δ
v
f(c)dc
)
and split up one of the terms in the middle:
=
1
EC∼C [C]
(∫ v+δ
v
cf(c)dc+ (v + δ)
∫ ∞
v+δ
f(c)dc − v
∫ v+δ
v
f(c)dc− v
∫ ∞
v+δ
f(c)dc+ δ
∫ v+δ
v
f(c)dc− δ
∫ v+δ
v
f(c)dc
)
=
1
EC∼C [C]
·
(∫ v+δ
v
cf(c)dc+ (v + δ)
∫ ∞
v+δ
f(c)dc − (v + δ)
∫ v+δ
v
f(c)dc − v
∫ ∞
v+δ
f(c)dc+ δ
∫ v+δ
v
f(c)dc
)
Next, we note that
∫ v+δ
v c · f(c)dc ≤ (v + δ)
∫ v+δ
v f(c)dc, so (v + δ)
∫ v+δ
v f(c)dc −
∫ v+δ
v c · f(c)dc ≤ 0. We
can drop this difference to get an upper bound
≤
1
EC∼C [C]
·
(
(v + δ)
∫ ∞
v+δ
f(c)dc− v
∫ ∞
v+δ
f(c)dc+ δ ·
∫ v+δ
v
f(c)dc
)
=
1
EC∼C [C]
·
(
δ
∫ ∞
v+δ
f(c)dc+ δ ·
∫ v+δ
v
f(c)dc
)
=
1
EC∼C [C]
· δ ·
∫ ∞
v
f(c)dc
≤
1
EC∼C [C]
· ǫ · EC∼C [C] ·
∫ ∞
v
f(c)dc = ǫ
∫ ∞
v
f(c)dc < ǫ
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Lemma 13. If there exists a fractional allocation v over candidate distributions {C} such that
∑
i vi =
V ′ < R that is α-fair, there also exists an allocation v′ that is α-fair and has utilization at least as large
as v, but additionally has the property that
∑
i vi = R .
Proof. This will be a proof by construction: we will construct an allocation that satisfies the desired
properties. At each step, if accomplishing the step would require more than all of the remaining resources,
then accomplish the step “partially” (as much as could be done with the remaining resources), and then
skip to the conclusion.
1. First, pick β∗ = maxi q(vi, Ci). For any groups j with βj < β
∗, increase their allocation vj until
βj = β
∗. This maintains α-fairness because it only decreases distance between the probability of
service between groups. Additionally, it either increases or holds constant the utilization. We know
that this is achievable (assuming sufficient resources) due to the continuity of q. If β∗ = 1, skip to the
last step.
2. Next, arbitrarily pick some α1 < α such that β
∗ + α1 ≤ 1. Pick some i ∈ [N ]. Increase vi until
q(v′i, Ci) = β
∗ + α1. Again, this is α-fair, utilization-increasing, and achievable assuming sufficient
resources.
3. Increase the allocation to all of the other groups until they reach β∗+α1. Repeat this processM times
until β∗ +
∑M
i=1 αi = 1. This preserves α-fairness, is utilization-increasing, and is achievable assuming
sufficient resources.
4. If this step is reached, the previous steps have resulted in an allocation of V ′′ < R, but with q(vi, Ci) =
1 ∀i. In this case, pick i ∈ [N ] arbitrarily and put the remaining R − V ′′ resources there. This does
not change its q(v′i, Ci) value because all of the candidates already receive resources. It also does not
change utilization, but it achieves
∑
i vi = R.
After this algorithm has been run, it results in an allocation that uses all of the resources, is α-fair, and
has utilization equal to or greater than the existing allocation.
Lemma 14. For the case where the allocation is equal to v+ ǫ, with v ∈ Z and 0 < ǫ < 1 over a discrete
distribution C, the following perspectives provide the same expected utilization:
• Viewing the allocation as deterministically providing v + ǫ resources.
• Viewing it as providing v resources with probability 1− ǫ and v + 1 resources with probability ǫ.
Proof. If we view this allocation deterministically, we could convert C to a continuous distribution that
has point mass probability at the integers and 0 mass elsewhere. In this case, the expected utilization
would be equal to:
v∑
c=0
c · f(c) + (1− F (v)) · (v + ǫ)
We would like our interpretation under the probablistic interpretation to simplify down to an equivalent
term. This interpretation looks like:
EVEC min(C, V ) = (1−ǫ)·
(
v∑
c=0
c · f(c) + v ·
(
∞∑
c=v+1
c · f(c)
))
+ǫ·
(
v+1∑
c=0
c · f(c) + (v + 1)
(
∞∑
c=v+2
c · f(c)
))
Combining the first terms in the sum first:(
v∑
c=0
c · f(c)
)
+ ǫ · (v + 1) · f(v + 1) + (1− ǫ) · v ·
(
∞∑
c=v+1
c · f(c)
)
+ ǫ · (v + 1) ·
(
∞∑
c=v+2
c · f(c)
)
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Absorbing the leftover ǫ · (v + 1) · f(v + 1) term inside:
=
(
v∑
c=0
c · f(c)
)
+ (1− ǫ) · v ·
(
∞∑
c=v+1
c · f(c)
)
+ ǫ · (v + 1) ·
(
∞∑
c=v+1
c · f(c)
)
=
(
v∑
c=0
c · f(c)
)
+
(
∞∑
c=v+1
c · f(c)
)
((1− ǫ) · v + ǫ · (v + 1))
=
(
v∑
c=0
c · f(c)
)
+ (1− F (v)) (v + ǫ)
As desired.
C Calculating max-utilizing fractional allocation
One contribution of this work is to consider the fractional allocation of resources. In this section, we
compute max-utilizing fractional resource allocations. The first section will focus on continuous candi-
date distributions, while the second section will analyze fractional allocation across discrete probability
distributions.
C.1 Fractional allocation over continuous candidate distributions
The goal of this section will be to prove the following theorem:
Theorem 4. A max-utilization fractional allocation v with resources R across groups with continuous
distributions {Ci} is one that satisfies:
• All of the CDFs Fi(vi) across the groups are equal to the same value, τ , except in the case where
Fi(0) > τ : in these cases, vi = 0.
• If the PDF of C has nonzero support everywhere, there will only be one max-utilization solution.
Given a set of resources R and probability distributions over candidates {Ci}, it is straightforward to
calculate the max-utilization allocation by running a binary search between CDF values of 0 and 1 across
the groups and finding the value where
∑
i vi = R.
In order to prove this theorem, first we will need to prove some properties of the functions we are working
with. Our goal will be to formulate this as a convex optimization problem.
Lemma 15. The derivative of the utilization function U(v, {C}) with respect to vi is Pi(C > vi) =
1− Fi(vi) for continuous functions.
Proof. If we have N groups, the overall utilization is equal to
U(v1, . . . vN ) =
N∑
i=1
EC∼Cimin(C, vi)
The derivative with respect to vi is 0 for all but one of the terms in this sum:
dU(v1, . . . vN )
dvi
=
d
dvi
EC∼Cimin(C, vi) =
d
dvi
[∫ vi
0
c · fi(c)dc + vi · (1− Fi(vi))
]
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We evaluate the derivative starting with the first term. By the fundamental theorem of calculus,
d
dvi
∫ vi
0
c · fi(c)dc = vi · fi(vi)
For the second term:
d
dvi
vi (1− Fi(vi)) =
d
dvi
(vi − vi · Fi(vi)) = 1− (Fi(vi) + vi · fi(vi)) = 1− Fi(vi)− vi · fi(vi)
where we have used the fact that the CDF’s derivative is the PDF. The sum of both terms together is
1− Fi(vi).
Lemma 16. The utilization function U(v) is concave. If the PDF is strictly greater than 0, then the
utilization function is strictly concave.
Proof. Given a function f with Hessian H, f is concave if and only if aTHa ≤ 0 for all a ∈ Rn/{0}. The
lemma above showed that the first derivative of U(v) with respect to vi is [0, . . . 1 − F (vi), . . . 0]. Given
this result, the Hessian is a matrix equal to −f(vi) in the ith row and ith column pair, with 0 elsewhere.
This tells us that
aTHa =
n∑
i=1
−a2i fi(vi)
fi(vi) ≥ 0, so this overall sum is ≤ 0. The inequality is strict when fi(vi) = 0 for some i, vi combination:
then, a a vector that has 0s everywhere but in the ith entry will have aTHa = 0. If fi(vi) > 0 always,
then the utility function is strictly concave, otherwise, it is concave.
Finally, we will put all of these pieces together to show how to find a max-utilization allocation for
continuous probability distributions. We will do this by formulating the problem as a convex optimization
problem satisfying the Karush–Kuhn–Tucker (KKT) conditions.
In the optimization problem, our goal is:
minimize −
N∑
i=1
ECi∼Ci min(Ci, vi)
subject to − vi ≤ 0 ∀i
(
N∑
i=1
vi
)
−R = 0
Following the example of Section 5.5 in Boyd and Vandenberghe (2004), we require that the inequality
equations are convex and the equality constraint is affine. A function f is convex if
f(t · x1 + (1− t) · x2) ≤ t · f(x1) + (1− t) · f(x2)
The inequality function is f(x) = −x, so plugging in for this on both sides yields
−t · x1 − (1− t) · x2 = −t · x1 − (1− t) · x2
satisfying convexity. A function is affine if it can be written as a linear transformation and a translation:
the equality
(∑N
i=1 ri
)
−R = 0 already satisfies those requirements.
Then, the KKT results tell us that any points with resource allocation v˜i, inequality constraints λ˜i and
equality constraint ν˜ that satisfy the below equations are primal and dual optimal, with 0 duality gap.
−v˜i ≤ 0 ∀i ∈ [N ]
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(
N∑
i=1
v˜i
)
−R = 0
λ˜i ≥ 0 ∀i ∈ [N ]
−λ˜iv˜i = 0 ∀i ∈ [N ]
∇v
(
N∑
i=1
ECi∼Ci min(Ci, vi)
)
+
N∑
i=1
∇v(λi(−vi)) +∇vν ·
((
N∑
i=1
vi
)
−R
)
= 0
Lemma 17. For continuous distributions {C} with continuous resource allocation, solutions to the above
equations are in the form
v˜i =
{
0 Fi(0) > 1 + ν˜
F−1i (1 + ν˜) Fi(0) ≤ 1 + ν˜
such that R =
∑
i∈I
F−1i (1 + ν˜) I = {i | Fi(0) ≤ 1 + ν˜}
No matter what {Fi} CDFs and 0 ≤ R <∞ values are provided, a solution exists of this form.
Proof. We will implement this proof by reasoning about the potential solutions to the results above. The
last equation involves taking the gradient at v˜, ν˜ and produces a vector-valued output. We the derivatives
below:
∇v ν
((
N∑
i=1
vi
)
−R
)
= ν · 1 which at optimality evaluates to ν˜ · 1
N∑
i=1
∇v(λi(−vi)) = −λ which evaluates to the vector − λ˜
∇v
(
N∑
i=1
ECi∼Ci min(Ci, vi)
)
=


1− F1(v1)
...
1− Fi(vi)
...
1− FN (vN )


which under optimality equals


1− F1(v˜1)
...
1− Fi(v˜i)
...
1− FN (v˜N )


Saying that we want this entire value to sum up to 0 means that we require:
(1− Fi(v˜i))− λ˜i + ν˜ = 0 ⇒ 1− λ˜i + ν˜ = Fi(v˜i) ∀i ∈ [N ]
Fi(vi), as the CDF of a probability distribution, is always monotonically decreasing in vi. If Fi(0) > 1+ ν˜,
then Fi(v˜i) > 1 + ν˜, so in order to satisfy Fi(v˜i) = 1 + λ˜i + ν˜, we need λ˜i > 0. By the third requirement
(vi · λ˜i = 0), this requires that v˜i = 0. This gives us part of the theorem results: Fi(0) > 1+ ν˜ ⇒ vi = 0.
Suppose instead that 1 + ν˜ > Fi(0). Because 1− λ˜i + ν˜ = Fi(vi) and λi ≥ 0, in order for this equality to
hold we must have Fi(vi) > Fi(0), which means vi > 0. Because vi · λ˜i = 0, this implies λ˜i = 0. This tells
us that Fi(v˜i) = 1 + ν˜, so v˜i = F
−1
i (1 + ν˜).
Finally, we consider the case where Fi(0) = 1+ ν˜. We remember that 1− λ˜i+ ν˜ = Fi(v˜i), so 1+ ν˜ ≥ Fi(r˜i),
and one of v˜i, λ˜i must be 0. If v˜i > 0, then we must have 1 + ν˜ = Fi(v˜i), which implies Fi(v˜i) = Fi(0).
Note that this is possible if Fi isn’t injective (specifically, if the PDF f is at some points equal to 0). If on
the other hand we have v˜i = 0, then Fi(vi) = 1+ ν˜ because Fi(vi) = Fi(0). In either case, vi = F
−1
i (1+ ν˜).
We can combine these results to indicate the value of v˜i:
v˜i =
{
0 Fi(0) > 1 + ν˜
F−1i (1 + ν˜) Fi(0) ≤ 1 + ν˜
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Rewriting with τ = 1 + ν˜ and including the equality constraint gives us
R =
(
N∑
i=1
v˜i
)
⇒ R =
∑
i∈I
F−1i (τ) I = {i | Fi(0) ≤ τ}
In order to find which τ satisfies the above requirements, a suggested implementation is to run binary
search over ν˜ ∈ [0, 1] to find a value that results in
∑
i v˜i = R. For τ = 0, vi = 0 satisfies the requirement
that vi = F
−1
i (0) if fi(0) = 0 and v˜i = 0 if Fi(0) > 0, producing R =
∑
i vi = 0.For ν˜ = 1, vi =∞ satisfies
vi = F
−1
i (1), producing
∑
i vi = R =∞. For any R ∈ (0,∞), τ ∈ [0, 1] will suffice.
Finally, if Fi(vi) has nonzero support everywhere, the utilization function is strictly concave and so there
exists only one location satisfying these requirements.
C.2 Fractional allocation over discrete candidate distributions
The above algorithm provides a method to allocate resources across continuous distributions. This method
will not work for discrete candidate distributions because it relies on calculating the derivative of the
utilization function, and for discrete allocations, this function is not differentiable. However, there exists
a simpler algorithm for allocating resources in this case. Algorithm 1 of Ganchev et al. [7] allocates each
marginal unit resource so as to maximize 1− Fi(vi), and Theorem 1 of the same paper proves that such
an algorithm maximizes expected utilization of the resource. For completeness, we include this theorem
and proof below, translated into the notation that the rest of this paper uses. However, we note that all
of the conent of this proof is taken directly from Ganchev et al. (2009).
C.2.1 Algorithm and proof from Ganchev et al. (2009)
Algorithm 1 describes the discrete allocation algorithm included in Ganchev et al. (2009). Note that it
differs in its presentation here in a) its notation, which uses the CDF rather than the tail probability, and
b) its use of the exact probability distributions rather than estimates. In order to make this adaptation,
we used the fact that
T (v) :=
∞∑
c=v
P (C = c) = 1− P (C ≤ v − 1) = 1− F (v − 1)
Algorithm 1: Allocation algorithm from Ganchev et al. [7]
1 Input: Budget R, probability distributions {Pi}
2 Output: An allocation v
3 v = 0
4 for l = 1 to R do
5 j ← argmaxi(1− Fi(vi))
6 vj ← vj + 1
7 end
Theorem 5. Algorithm 1 maximizes the expected utilization of resources allocated over the distributions.
In preparation of proving this theorem, we note that
(v − 1)P (c = v − 1) + v
∞∑
c=v
P (C = c) = (v − 1)
∞∑
c=v−1
P (C = c) +
∞∑
c=v
P (C = c)
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The fact can be proved by rearranging the LHS:
(v − 1)P (c = v − 1) + v
∞∑
c=v
P (C = c) = (v − 1)P (c = v − 1) + (v − 1)
∞∑
c=v
P (C = c) +
∞∑
c=v
P (C = c)
= (v − 1)
∞∑
c=v−1
P (C = c) +
∞∑
c=v
P (C = c)
Proof from Ganchev et al. [7]. Because 1 − Fi(vi) ≥ 1 − Fi(vi + 1), in greedily selecting to maximize
1− Fi(vi), the algorithm returns
argmaxv
N∑
i=1
vi∑
c=1
(1− Fi(c)) s.t.
N∑
i=1
vi = R
We show that this value is equivalent to the expected utilization of this allocation. Working with an
arbitrary group i,
EC∼Ci min(C, vi) =
vi−1∑
c=1
c · P (C = c) + vi ·
∞∑
c=vi
P (C = c)
=
vi−2∑
c=1
c · P (C = c) + (vi − 1) · P (C = vi − 1) + vi ·
∞∑
c=vi
P (C = c)
Using the result above, we can rewrite this as:
=
vi−2∑
c=1
c · P (C = c) + (vi − 1)
∞∑
c=vi−1
P (C = c) +
∞∑
c=vi
P (C = c)
If we repeated this procedure once more, we would obtain
=
vi−3∑
c=1
c · P (C = c) + (vi − 2)
∞∑
c=vi−2
P (C = c) +
∞∑
c=vi−1
P (C = c) +
∞∑
c=vi
P (C = c)
If we repeated this procedure a total of vi − 1 times, we would obtain the result:
EC∼Ci min(C, vi) =
vi−1∑
c=0
(1− Fi(c))
This allows us to write
N∑
i=1
vi∑
c=1
(1− Fi(c)) =
N∑
i=1
vi∑
c=1
EC∼Ci min(C, vi)
Algorithm 1 maximizes the term on the LHS, so it also maximizes the expected utilization.
C.2.2 Extension of Algorithm 1 to fractional resource allocation
The theorem above assumes integer-valued allocation of resources: each vi is increased in integer steps. In
this section, we will show that even allowing fractional allocation of resources across discrete distributions,
the max-utilizing allocation will still be integer-valued. Given that Algorithm 1 returns an allocation that
maximizes utilization over discrete allocations, this same allocation will also maximize utilization over
continuous allocations.
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C.2 Fractional & discrete C FRACTIONAL ALLOCATION
Lemma 18. Fractional allocation of resources across discrete distributions produces an allocation v with
integer values.
Proof. Suppose by contradiction that the allocation had non-integer values. Because
∑
i vi = R ∈ N,
there must be multiple groups with vi 6∈ N. Take vi = ni + ǫi and vj = nj + ǫj , with ni, nj ∈ N. The
utilization of each group is equal to
ni∑
c=0
c · fi(c) + (ni + ǫi) · (1− Fi(ni))
nj∑
c=0
c · fj(c) + (nj + ǫj) · (1− Fj(nj))
WLOG, assume that 1 − Fi(ni) ≥ 1 − Fj(nj). First, consider the case where ǫi + ǫj ≤ 1. We will show
that we can create an allocation with equal or greater utilization. Take v′i = ni + ǫi + ǫj and v
′
j = nj.
This has utilization in each group equal to
ni∑
c=0
c · fi(c) + (ni + ǫi + ǫj) · (1− Fi(ni))
nj∑
c=0
c · fj(c) + nj · (1− Fj(nj))
Changing from {vi, vj} to {v
′
i, v
′
j} has a net change on the total utilization across these two groups of
ǫj · ((1 − Fi(ni)− (1− Fj(nj))) ≥ 0
Secondly, we must consider the alternate case where ǫi + ǫj > 1. Then, take v
′
i = ni + 1 and v
′
j =
nj + ǫj − (1− ǫi). This has utilization in each group equal to
ni∑
c=0
c · fi(c) + (ni + 1) · (1− Fi(ni))
nj∑
c=0
c · fj(c) + (nj + ǫj − (1− ǫi)) · (1− Fj(nj))
Changing from {vi, vj} to {v
′
i, v
′
j} has a net impact on total utilization of
(1− ǫj) · ((1− Fi(ni)− (1− Fj(nj))) ≥ 0
In both cases, we have shown that, by turning one of the allocations from a fractional to integer-valued
allocation, we can either have the same utilization or improve utilization. By continuing this process, we
can turn all of the fractional allocations to discrete ones: for the last pair of groups, ǫi + ǫj = 1 because
the total amount of resources must be integer-valued. This contradicts the assumption that the fractional
allocation was max-utilizing, so the overall max-utilizing allocation must be integer valued.
This proof shows that the allocation returned by Algorithm 1 is also max-utilizing under fractional
allocation.
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